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 At given levels of economic activity, increases in tax revenue require either 
higher tax rates or a wider tax base. Higher tax rates cause greater distortions 
to economic decisions, so widening of the tax base is preferred on efficiency 
grounds. But considerations of fairness and ability to pay are also relevant, as 
pointed out by Geary Lecturer, James Poterba: “There is often a trade-off 
between an efficient tax system which has a very broad base and low rates and 
a tax system which ....does not put substantial burdens on those with relatively 
low ability to pay”. (Poterba, 2010, p. 135) The balance between these 
considerations cannot be decided on a purely theoretical basis: careful analysis  
of particular proposals for widening of the tax base or changes in tax structure 
are needed. Recent research under the Institute’s programme for Taxation, 
Welfare and Pensions has helped to clarify the impact of alternative base-
widening options in three areas: property tax, the tax treatment of pension 
contributions, and the tax treatment of child benefit. Brief summaries of the 
findings of each of these pieces of research are given here, and links to the full 
publications are to be found at the end of this article. 
 
 Annual taxes on property make a significant contribution to tax revenues in 
many OECD countries. In the Irish context, taxes on property have been 
focused on stamp duties, payable when a property is changing hands. There are 
two major drawbacks to this transactions-based approach. First, stamp duties 
put barriers in the way of mobility and distort decisions about whether to 
move or to refurbish/extend an existing home in the face of changed 
circumstances. Second, a transactions-based tax is vulnerable to cyclical 
variation, as evidenced by the collapse of stamp duties from the housing 
market in the recent past. An annual property tax, of the type proposed by the 
Commission on Taxation, could provide a more stable source of revenue while 
encouraging efficient use of the housing stock.  
Property Tax 
 
How could a property tax be designed to take account of ability to pay? 
Callan et al. (2010) show that a property tax could be designed to take account 
of the income of property-owners, and still raise substantial revenue. For 
example, a tax which provided full or partial relief to the poorest one-third of 
the population could still raise revenue of close to €1 billion per year. 
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An annual property tax would widen the tax base from one consisting of 
sales and purchases of property, to one including all residential property. 
Instead of a high rate on infrequent transactions, there would be a low rate for 
an annual tax. There are strong efficiency arguments in favour of this 
approach. But there are also issues of fairness involved in the transition from a 
long-standing regime based on stamp duties to one based on an annual 
property tax. The Commission on Taxation recommended an exemption from 
the annual property tax for a fixed, seven-year period from the date of 
purchase. An alternative would be to vary the length of the exemption to take 
account of the rate of stamp duty paid, and the point in the house price cycle 
at which it was paid. Consequently those who paid most stamp duty during the 
years of rapidly rising house prices would obtain greatest relief. 
 
 Currently, pension contributions are excluded from taxable income. The 
National Pensions Framework contains a commitment to change the tax 
treatment of pension contributions. Instead of providing relief on pension 
contributions at the taxpayer’s marginal rate (either the standard rate of 20 per 
cent or the top rate of 41 per cent) the Framework envisages a matching 
contribution equivalent to tax relief at a hybrid rate of 33 per cent (with the 
delivery mechanism yet to be determined). Recent ESRI research (Callan et al., 
2009b) helps to identify the potential impact of this approach. 
Tax 
Treatment of 
Pension 
Contributions 
 
The rationale for a standardized rate of relief or support for pension 
contributions is that under current arrangements there are strong incentives for 
high income earners to participate in pension schemes, but a weaker incentive 
for those with low and middle incomes. The proposed changes would tilt this 
balance, with a reduction in the incentive for those on high incomes and an 
increased incentive for those on low and middle incomes. Analysis of a shift 
towards relief at a single 30 per cent rate – similar to that proposed in the 
National Pensions Framework – shows that the immediate impact would 
involve gains for standard rate taxpayers and losses for top rate taxpayers, and 
a net gain to the Exchequer in the region of €500m per year.  
 
Evidence from the UK and the US suggests that much of the saving by 
high income households would take place even without the incentive (what 
economists call “deadweight loss”) – although it might take place in different 
forms. There is also growing evidence that decisions on pensions can be 
strongly influenced by non-economic factors, at lower cash cost to the 
Exchequer. For example, pension schemes in which the default option is to 
enrol in the scheme (“auto-enrolment”), but with an option for individuals to 
withdraw (sometimes called “soft mandatory”), have been found to be 
effective in other countries. The National Pensions Framework also contains a 
commitment to the introduction of an “auto-enrolment” scheme.  
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Currently child benefit is not included in the definition of income for 
taxation purposes. Widening the income tax base to include child benefit could 
allow the net benefit to be better targeted, ensuring that the greatest net benefit 
is obtained by those with the lowest incomes. A key advantage of the taxation 
approach is that it would not involve new benefit withdrawal rates but would 
instead use the existing tax rates to improve targeting. Means-testing, on the 
other hand, would involve new benefit withdrawal rates which would operate 
in addition to the income tax rates. These issues were explored by Callan et al. 
(2009a) in the context of the choices facing government in framing cuts in 
expenditure in Budget 2010, and remain relevant today. 
Child Benefit 
 
The Commission on Taxation advised that Child Benefit should be included 
in taxable income, but that this suggestion should be compared to the 
alternatives, such as means testing. The Report of the Special Group on Public 
Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes also suggested either making 
Child Benefit taxable, making it a means-tested benefit or reducing rates to 
arrive at a 20 per cent cut in expenditure. Budget 2010 opted to reduce Child 
Benefit payment rates by 10 per cent, with a compensating increase in the child 
dependant additions for recipients of social welfare payments. 
 
A means test on Child Benefit would involve a new “benefit withdrawal 
rate” which acts to increase effective marginal tax rates (i.e., the proportion of 
an increase in gross income which is deducted either in the form of increased 
tax and social insurance or withdrawal of welfare benefits). Thus it would tend 
to boost out-of-work income relative to in-work income, and would certainly 
lead to higher marginal tax rates facing some of those in work. Making the 
payment taxable would also have some impact on marginal tax rates, as some 
of those with children would move to a higher tax rate, or into the tax net – 
but the net impact on incentives would be lower. The “rate cutting” option 
would reduce income in work and in unemployment by the same amount, 
leaving the gap between the two unchanged. Cutting rates of Child Benefit 
while providing compensation through child dependant addition payments – 
the option chosen in Budget 2010 - tends to narrow the gap between in-work 
and out-of-work incomes. Looking to the future, the option of broadening the 
base to include Child Benefit as part of taxable income offers a structure which 
could help to balance the objectives of providing greater support at lowest 
income levels, moderate effective tax rates, a payment which reaches all 
children, and a sustainable overall Exchequer cost. 
 
 Efficiency considerations point towards the advantages of low tax rates on a 
wide base. Tax policy must also take into account other considerations, 
including concerns for fairness and ability to pay. Where these goals come into 
conflict, careful analysis of the options is needed to inform judgements as to 
the best balance. The research summarised here illustrates how the issues vary 
depending on the nature of the base-broadening proposal – there is no short-
cut method which can provide easy answers or avoid difficult judgements. 
Conclusion 
    3 
 
4 
 
REFERENCES 
 
CALLAN, T., C. KEANE and J.R. WALSH, 2009a. “Tax Reform: Selected 
Issues” in T. CALLAN (ed.) Budget Perspectives 2010, Dublin: The Economic 
and Social Research Institute, Research Series No. 12. 
 
CALLAN, T., C. KEANE and J.R. WALSH, 2009b. Pension Policy: New 
Evidence on Key Issues, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Research Series No. 14. 
 
CALLAN, T., C. KEANE and J.R. WALSH, 2010. “What Role for Property 
Taxes in Ireland?” , The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 87-107. 
 
POTERBA, J., 2010. “The Challenge of Tax Reform and Expanding the Tax 
Base – Geary Lecture 2009”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
pp. 133-148. 
